News Source Credibility in the Eyes of Different Assessors by Mensio, Martino & Alani, Harith
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
News Source Credibility in the Eyes of Different
Assessors
Conference or Workshop Item
How to cite:
Mensio, Martino and Alani, Harith (2019). News Source Credibility in the Eyes of Different Assessors. In:
Conference for Truth and Trust Online, 4-5 Oct 2019, London, UK, (In Press).
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
https://truthandtrustonline.com/
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
News Source Credibility in the Eyes of Different Assessors
Martino Mensio, Harith Alani
Knowledge Media Institute, The Open University, UK
{martino.mensio,h.alani}@open.ac.uk
Abstract
With misinformation being one of the biggest
issues of current times, many organisations are
emerging to offer verifications of information
and assessments of news sources. However,
it remains unclear how they relate in terms
of coverage, overlap and agreement. In this
paper we introduce a comparison of the as-
sessments produced by different organisations,
in order to measure their overlap and agree-
ment on news sources. Relying on the gen-
eral term of credibility, we map each of the
different assessments to a unified scale. Then
we compare two different levels of credibil-
ity assessments (source level and document
level) by using the data published by various
organisations, including fact-checkers, to see
which sources they assess more than others,
how much overlap there is between them, and
how much agreement there is between their
verdicts. Our results show that the overlap be-
tween the different origins is generally quite
low, meaning that different experts and tools
provide evaluations for a rather disjoint set of
sources, also when considering fact-checking.
For agreement, instead we find that there are
origins that agree more than others on the ver-
dicts.
1 Introduction
In a public sphere polluted by different shapes of
misinformation, the most important role is played
by the citizens (Cooke, 2017), with their ability to
think critically and investigate while consuming a
piece of news. In order to investigate, there is a
wide variety of tools that can help, by providing
indicators of credibility on different levels.
Checking the source that published a piece of
news is one of the first steps often referred to in
media literacy (Wineburg et al., 2016). Identify-
ing who created the content and where it has been
published can tell a lot about its credibility even
before inspecting the news itself.
There are many efforts by journalists, fact-
checkers and communities that annotate the rela-
tionship between the sources and misinformation.
Various tools exist that rely on such annotations
to notify users of the validity (or invalidity) of the
information they are looking at.
It is inevitable that different verification organ-
isations will sometime produce slightly different,
or even conflicting, assessments of certain news
articles or sources. It is also natural for verifica-
tion sources to focus on news sources and not oth-
ers. Such diversity is often needed, to reduce bias
and to encourage further debate. This paper aims
to reach a better awareness of such overlap and di-
versity, as a first step towards understanding how
to relay such information to end users, and the po-
tential impact on their final judgements.
To the end, this study compares the different in-
formation assessments available, looking for sim-
ilarities and differences between them. In order to
perform this comparison, however, there is a set of
problems that need to be addressed. Each asses-
sor uses a different set of labels and scores in their
assessments. This variety stems from different cri-
teria and methods of assessment.
Given the above, in this paper we investigate the
following Research Questions:
1. How much do different assessments overlap
when evaluating the same sources?
2. How often do different assessments, and as-
sessors, agree? And which ones are more
similar or different to each other?
3. Do fact-checkers check claims from sources
that have been assessed at the source-level?
And do the outcomes agree?
To answer these questions, this work presents
two main contributions. First, after describing in
Section 2 existing works that define credibility, in
Section 3 we present our strategy to combine and
make comparable different existing assessments,
mapping from their specific features to a common
measure of credibility. The second is the measure-
ment of overlap and agreement in Section 4, to ex-
press how much the considered assessments evalu-
ate the same sources and whether or not they have
the same outcomes. Then Section 5 presents the
main challenges that we see for the next steps and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
In this section, we first look into studies that de-
fine and formalise the concept of credibility. Then,
after presenting the main assessments that are al-
ready available, we take a look at some methods
for combining them together.
2.1 Credibility formalisation
One of the first works on source credibility (Hov-
land and Weiss, 1951) identified two main com-
ponents (trustworthiness and expertise), and sub-
sequent studies underlined the many different di-
mensions to be analysed (Gaziano and McGrath,
1986). Meyer (1988) identified two main compo-
nents of credibility (believability and community
affiliation), analysing their correlation with a set
of items (bias, fairness, accuracy, patriotism, trust,
security) retrieved by interviewing users. Later
works (Abdulla et al., 2004; Yale et al., 2015;
Kohring and Matthes, 2007) use this model and
find variations on the number of factors and the
importance of the items. A recent work (Proc-
hazka and Schweiger, 2019) compares measures
of credibility and trust, to obtain a generalised
measure of trustworthiness of news media. From
the point of W3C, the Credible Web Community
Group1 aims to standardise the assessments and
credibility signals.
From the analysis of these studies, we have as
objectives to define which specific declination of
credibility we want to use and to understand the
relationships of different components (bias, factu-
ality, security, intent to deceive) with the selected
measure of credibility. Of the two components
identified in Meyer (1988), we are more interested
in the believability component, because we want
to have a measure of how much factual informa-
tion a certain source provides and the quality of
its journalism. Instead, the component of com-
munity affiliation is more related to opinions and
points of view, and it may be related to political
1https://credweb.org/
position, partisanship and a set of factors that go
beyond the scope of evaluating credibility. Then
there are mixed factors (e.g., bias) that can be gen-
erated by the community affiliation but affect the
believability as well.
2.2 Real-world assessments
Here we present the existing assessments that
provide credibility-related assessments, focusing
mainly on human-generated evaluations that come
from experts in journalism. We can identify
two main levels of evaluations: source-level and
document-level.
2.2.1 NG: NewsGuard
On the source-level assessments, we start with
NewsGuard,2 that provides ratings of reliabil-
ity of online news brands through “nutrition la-
bels”. The ratings are generated by journalists
that rate the website compliance to a set of crite-
ria.3 These criteria are divided into two groups:
credibility (publishing false content, presenting
information responsibly, regularly correcting er-
rors, distinguishing news and opinions, avoid-
ing deceptive headlines) and transparency (own-
ership and financing, clearly labelling advertis-
ing, management, providing names of content cre-
ators). The websites also receive an overall score
(a sum of points for each criteria) and a label, that
can be Trustworthy, Negative, Satire or
Platform (user-generated contents, e.g., social
networks or blogs).
2.2.2 MBFC: Media Bias/Fact Check
Another origin of ratings is Media Bias/Fact
Check,4 that provides reports assessing the factual
level of the sources (VERY LOW, LOW, MIXED,
HIGH, VERY HIGH) and the kind of bias
(CONSPIRACY-PSEUDOSCIENCE, LEAST
BIASED, LEFT BIAS, LEFT-CENTER BIAS,
PRO-SCIENCE, QUESTIONABLE SOURCE,
RIGHT BIAS, RIGHT-CENTER BIAS,
SATIRE). The evaluations are produced by a
team of editors with their own methodology.5
2https://www.newsguardtech.com/
3http://www.newsguardtech.com/ratings/
rating-process-criteria/
4https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
5https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
methodology/
2.2.3 WOT: My Web of Trust
My Web of Trust6 is a crowdsourced reputa-
tion service that provides assessments of websites
through a browser extension. It provides two com-
ponents of trustworthiness (“How much do you
trust this site?”) and safety (“How suitable is this
site for children?”), in terms of a score and a confi-
dence measure.7 Users can see the overall ratings
and comments coming from the community and
can provide their own rating.
2.2.4 OS: OpenSources
OpenSources8 was a resource for assessing online
information sources. The list was created looking
for overall inaccuracy, extreme biases, lack of
transparency, and other kinds of misinformation.
The possible tags given to websites are the
following: fake news, satire, extreme
bias, conspiracy theory, rumor mill,
state news, junk science, hate news,
clickbait, proceed with caution,
political and reliable. A domain can
have up to three different tags. The list was
recently taken down, possibly due to lack of
updates, where many of the website they assessed
have been shut down or have been renamed
(usually because of domain hopping).9
2.2.5 IFCN: International Fact Checking
Network
The International Fact Checking Network (IFCN)
comes into play as domain-assessor considering
that it evaluates the signatory compliance with a
set of principles.10 IFCN reviews twelve aspects
grouped into five principles (organisation, non-
partisanship and fairness, transparency of sources,
transparency of funding and of organisation, trans-
parency of methodology, correction policy) and
the assessment lasts for one year from the certi-
fication date. IFCN is currently considered as the
reference point for the credibility of fact-checkers,
as third-party fact-checking initiatives arise on
6https://www.mywot.com/
7https://www.mywot.com/wiki/index.php/
API
8http://www.opensources.co/ down from 2019
9https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
craigsilverman/publishers-are-switching-
domain-names-to-try-and-stay-ahead
10https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/
know-more/what-it-takes-to-be-a-
signatory
big platforms (e.g., Facebook,11 Youtube12 and
Google Search13).
2.2.6 NTT: Newsroom Transparency Tracker
Newsroom Transparency Tracker14 is an initiative
part of The Trust Project, that shares the infor-
mation published by media outlets with respect to
four Trust Indicators (best practices, journalist ex-
pertise, type of work, diverse voices). Each source
is characterised by 15 attributes, belonging to one
of the indicators, that can be full, partial or
none compliant.
2.2.7 FC: Fact-checkers
On the document and claim level we have fact-
checkers, that manually review and debunk stories
by using different rating methods. In the last years
there has been a standardisation process towards
a ClaimReview schema,15 in order to publish
the reviews in a structured format. However, only
some fact-checkers adopted the standard,16 and
those who did sometimes differ in how they use
some of the ClaimReview schema fields.
2.3 Combining assessments
Looking for ways to combine existing assess-
ments, we found studies spanning several ideas.
Trust Networks (Golbeck et al., 2003) are built for
user-user ratings of trust, creating a graph where
users are nodes and trust scores are directed edges.
Using rules of network capacity (the maximum
amount of trust between a source and a sink is lim-
ited by the smallest edge weight along the path)
it is possible to infer the trust between an arbi-
trary couple of nodes. A different model of trust
propagation is presented in (Bistarelli and Santini,
2007), also accounting for confidence values. The
authors combine different evaluations on the same
node by taking the one with the higher value of
confidence, expressed by the source node. Simi-
larly, the theory of belief functions (Beynon et al.,
11https://www.facebook.com/help/
publisher/182222309230722
12https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/
2019/youtube-is-now-surfacing-fact-
checks-in-search-heres-how-it-works/
13https://www.blog.google/products/
search/fact-check-now-available-google-
search-and-news-around-world/
14https://www.newsroomtransparencytracker.com/
15https://schema.org/ClaimReview
16https://reporterslab.org/a-better-
claimreview-to-grow-a-global-fact-
check-database/
2000) models decisions with uncertainty and mul-
tiple agents. However, it lacks a weighting mecha-
nism to include the credibility of the source nodes
providing the evaluations. We discuss in Section 5
the requirements for a decision criterion when the
outcomes of evaluations disagree.
3 Approach
In order to combine the different assessments, we
build a graph in which the nodes represent reg-
istered domain names (referred to as “sources”
throughout this document), and the edges instead
correspond to the assessments retrieved from the
origins listed earlier. An origin can be differ-
ent from the source, when we retrieve a set of
evaluations from a third party. For example, the
data for the fact-checkers coming from DataCom-
mons17 contains as source nodes the fact-checkers
that created the corresponding ClaimReview.
In this work we are keeping as nodes only the
sources, without also representing the documents,
in order to simplify this preliminary study. There-
fore, if the assessments point to a specific docu-
ment (identifiable with a URL), the tail of the edge
goes to the source extracted from the URL. Multi-
ple parallel edges can exist between the same cou-
ple of nodes.
Figure 1: A small sample of the source-level credibil-
ity graph. The colours of the edges represent the value
of the credibility expressed: red stands for negative as-
sessments, green for positive ones, passing gradually
through shades of yellow.
In Figure 1 we can see a small sample of the
graph, representing some connections that come
from the sources of data available. In this small
sample we can already see some disagreement on
17https://datacommons.org/factcheck/
download
the evaluation of the domain zerohedge.com,
as will be analysed in Section 4.
3.1 Credibility definition
We use the term credibility to capture the differ-
ent assessments provided by the various origina-
tors listed in Section 2. Credibility is a measure
that can be positive or negative. It represents how
the assessor judges a given source, which tends
to be based on factors of factuality (objective fac-
tors) and believability (subjective factors) (Meyer,
1988).
Credibility value is relative to the origin that
gave the assessment. This means that it is also de-
pendent on the credibility values of the assessors
themselves.
A credibility measure is characterised by a
value, that indicates whether it is positive, nega-
tive or neutral with a range of [−1;+1]. It also has
a measure of confidence that expresses the level of
certainty of the assessment, in the range [0; +1].
3.2 Mapping the vocabulary
From the theories analysed in Section 2.1 we can
score importance of the factors according to our
definition of credibility: first indications of factu-
ality and adherence to journalistic standards and
transparency, then the ones about extremism (e.g.,
conspiracy theories) and intent to deceive (e.g.,
clickbait, misleading) (Volkova and Jang, 2018).
To translate the values provided by the various ori-
gins described in Section 2.2, we used the method
described in Table 1. These values are obtained by
taking indicators of credibility that are relevant for
the believability component and not for the com-
munity affiliation. In most cases, the mapping is
just a selection of indicators coming from the ori-
gin and a translation to the desired interval for
credibility and confidence. The ones that are most
opinionated are the values used for OS due to the
big variety of labels that it provides. However, the
qualitative comparison in the following is made on
the original values and not on our mapping values,
in order to be able to discuss and optimise these
parameters later.
4 Analysis and Results
In this section, after presenting some statistics
about the data that have been collected, we de-
scribe how we measure the overlap and agreement
between two assessment origins, showing the re-
origin credibility formulation confidence formulation
NG linear score[0; 100]→ cred[−1; 1]
exception Platform, Satire→ cred = 0
conf = 1
exception Platform, Satire→ conf = 0
MBFC factuality{LOW,MIXED,HIGH} → cred{−1, 0, 1} conf = 1 if factuality, otherwise conf = 0
WOT trust.score[0; 100]→ cred[−1; 1] trust.conf [0; 100]→ conf [0; 1]
OS fake→ −1, reliable→ 1
conspiracy, junksci→ −0.8 clickbait, bias→ −0.5
rumor, hate→ −0.3 all other tags→ 0
conf = 1 when credibility is not null
otherwise conf = 0
IFCN starting from cred = 1 apply penalties for partially (0.05) and none (0.1)
compliant with lower bound cred = 0
if expired signatory conf = 0.5
otherwise conf = 1
NTT proportionally to the number of indicators satisfied,
partial compliance counts half
conf = 1
FC if ratingValue in the reviewRating18
cred = ratingValue−worstRatingbestRating−worstRating ∗ 2− 1
otherwise map the alternateName with a known list (e.g. true = 1.0)
if the mapping is successful conf = 1
otherwise conf = 0
Table 1: The mapping to obtain credibility and confidence values for each of the origins considered.
sults of both measures on the considered subsets
of information. Then we show a similar analysis
comparing the source-level assessments with the
data coming from the fact-checkers, thus provid-
ing a response to the third Research Question.
4.1 Data statistics
For collecting the data used in this paper, we first
took the first 1 million entries from the list con-
tained in the Open PageRank dataset,19 reducing
it to 762194 sources by removing the subdomains.
This list has been used in order to retrieve the as-
sessments An overall view of the data retrieved
from each of the origins listed in Section 2.2 can
be seen in Table 2. Looking at the second col-
umn, we can see that the biggest origin of ratings is
WOT, covering 40% of the sources used as input.
Then all the other rating origins have a size that is
orders of magnitude smaller. Given these sizes, it
is clear that many domains only have one or two
assessments available. Together with this measure
of coverage, we also show the average value of
credibility assigned by using our mappings, that
gives an idea of the average verdict coming from
the considered origin.
4.2 Overlap
The first of our Research Questions is about the
overlap, defined as the condition when two origins
evaluate the same source. Given the different num-
ber of ratings from each origin, we want to have a
measure that expresses in a meaningful way the
relationship between the sets of sources with re-
18https://schema.org/Rating
19https://www.domcop.com/openpagerank/
what-is-openpagerank
origin #sources avg. credibility
WOT 308155 0.4264
NG 2795 0.5433
MBFC 2404 0.3874
OS 811 -0.6618
IFCN 82 0.8786
NTT 52 0.4256
Table 2: The top origins of assessments, in terms of
number of rated sources.
spect to the origins. One measure is the Jaccard
index (Jaccard, 1901), that is specific to measur-
ing the overlap of sets. However, when one of the
sets is much bigger than the other, the index val-
ues become too insignificant. A related measure is
Szymkiewicz-Simpson coefficient that, while ac-
counting for size scale problem, is still a sym-
metric measure considering as denominator the
smaller size between the two sets (Vijaymeena and
Kavitha, 2016). For these reasons, we selected an
asymmetrical measure of overlap (Yoshida et al.,
2001) that considers the ratio of the intersection of
two sets over the size of the second set:
overlap(A→ B) = |A ∩B||B|
In this way, we can establish how much of the first
set belongs to the second one. Figure 2 shows the
pairwise values of this measure.
Looking at the first column, we can see that
all the origins have a high overlap with WOT,
meaning that it almost covers the entirety of do-
mains under analysis. Nevertheless, there are do-
mains that have not been rated by WOT, which are
WO
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Figure 2: The directed overlap coefficient between
each pair of origins of credibility assessment. The
value of each cell shows the percentage of how many
sources evaluated from the assessor on the row have
also been evaluated by the assessor on the column.
Darker colours mean lower overlap.
mainly recent websites created after 2016.20 We
can also observe that many credibility origins have
a high overlap ratio with MBFC and NG, even
though the two sets have a low overlap themselves.
Overall, we see that the overlap is quite low, with
an overall average value of 0.276.
4.3 Agreement
For measuring the agreement of the credibility as-
sessments, the vocabulary mapping described in
3.2 was used to convert the assessments to the
common scale of credibility. To answer the second
Research Question, we use as a measure of agree-
ment the cosine similarity of the evaluations pro-
vided by pairs of origins on the sources that they
both rate. Input to the similarity computation is
two arrays of scores of credibility with an element
for each of the sources that have been evaluated
by both origins of assessments. We can interpret
the cosine similarity as a measure of correlation
between the two origins. Cosine similarity gives a
value that is bound in the interval [−1;+1], with
+1 being an indication of total agreement and −1
of total disagreement: the angle formed between
the two multidimensional vectors of ratings (fea-
tures) gives an indication of discrepancy between
the two origins considered.
20https://www.pcworld.com/article/
3139814/web-of-trust-browser-extensions-
yanked-after-proving-untrustworthy.html
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Figure 3: The pairwise cosine similarity between the
different origins of credibility assessments, calculated
from the nodes that they both assess. Green values cor-
respond to high similarity, and red to disagreement.
In Figure 3 we can see the values of agreement
highlighting groups of origins that agree more
than others. For example, the group (WOT, NG,
MBFC) has very high values of agreement. The
high values in the row of IFCN instead shows that
in most cases, the sources agree on giving high
credibility to the IFCN signatories.
There are however a few values that demon-
strate some disagreement, that need to be taken
into account together with the corresponding over-
lap of each cell. In the specific case of intersection
between IFCN and OS, the red colour is caused by
the only domain weeklystandard.com that
they both rate: IFCN rates it with a positive score,
since it is a signatory (at the moment with an
expired assessment),21 while OS tags this source
as political and extreme bias, that has a
generally negative connotation. Another example
is the intersection between NTT and OS on the do-
main ijr.com that satisfies 10 criteria out of 15
for NTT, while OS tags it as political, bias
and unreliable. This domain is positively re-
viewed also by NG and MBFC. Even between ori-
gins that generally agree, there are some inter-
esting cases: zerohedge.com is rated as 90%
trustworthy by WOT, while NG gives a completely
negative score, saying that it “severely violates
basic standards of credibility and transparency”.
The website is tagged as conspiracy also by
OS. Similarly, there is a big group of sources22
21https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/
profile/tws-fact-check
22freedomsphoenix.com, rawstory.com,
that OS tags as conspiracy, clickbait and
bias, but on WOT they are considered as trust-
worthy.
In general, we see many cases where suppos-
edly high-quality origins do not agree. Such dis-
agreement might be due to difference in opinion,
to the use of different assessment methods, or sim-
ply to the difference in what exactly is being as-
sessed.
4.4 Fact-checking vs source assessments
In order to analyse the relationship between the
assessments of the sources with the detailed eval-
uations done by fact-checkers (RQ3), we consid-
ered two different groups of origins: source-level
assessments on the one side and fact-checkers on
the other. For the latter, the choice of fact-checkers
was done by the availability of annotated data: a
subset of IFCN signatories using ClaimReview
with the addition of the data from EuVsDisinfo.23
Table 3 shows how many different sources have
been fact-checked by each of the fact-checkers.
The low values are often due to the lack of proper
annotation of the Claim appearance.24
Fact Checker #sources of claims
politifact.com 367
euvsdisinfo.com 244
factcrescendo.com 27
factcheckni.org 27
aap.com.au 20
factly.in 18
tempo.co 10
lemonde.fr 10
Table 3: Fact-checkers sorted by decreasing number of
unique sources checked.
We evaluated overlap and agreement in the
same way as in previous sections, with the only
difference that in this case we are comparing the
fact-checkers with regard to the source-level as-
sessments. Figure 4 shows both overlap and agree-
ment measures for this comparison.
Starting with overlap, the fact-checker data that
we have collected shows that only a small portion
of the claims reviewed appear on sources known
by the domain-level origins, with the exception of
informationclearinghouse.info,
antiwar.com, allnewspipeline.com,
americablog.com
23https://euvsdisinfo.eu/
24https://schema.org/Claim
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Figure 4: The overlap and agreement measures be-
tween fact-checkers and source-level assessors. For
overlap, the value of each cell shows how much the
domains reviewed by the fact-checkers have also been
evaluated by the origins on the columns. The agree-
ment is evaluated on sources that have both ratings.
WOT. NG and MBFC have still significant overlap
with some of the fact-checkers.
Considering the agreement instead, we can see
that the column of NG has always non-negative
similarities (meaning that the outcomes of fact-
checks in most cases match with the label given
to the source by the assessment in the column),
and this could indicate a match between the crite-
ria evaluated and the effective history of publish-
ing genuine news. Looking row-wise instead, we
see that PolitiFact is the fact-checker that mostly
agrees with domain-level assessments.
The only row to disagree with the IFCN source-
level assessment (meaning that a fact-checker has
been debunked) is aap.com.au, that in our
dataset debunked 3 times abc.net.au. Always
on the AAP row, the disagreement with OS is be-
cause of dailytelegraph.com.au, that has
been fact-checked several times with opposing la-
bels (some stories are true and some are false) re-
sulting in an average of 0.2 credibility (still posi-
tive), while OS tags it as bias/rumour. In this
case this comparison shows the importance putting
a higher weight on fact-checks with negative re-
sults (publishing false content is more penalising).
Inspecting the other rows, we find different
types of disagreement. The first group re-
lates to the platforms, such as Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, Blogspot and Instagram, that
have been fact-checked on a more detailed level
(post/profile/blog) by the different fact-checkers
for which we have the data. On sources with user-
generated content, NG does not provide an eval-
uation itself, but it seems that WOT instead gen-
erally gives a positive score. This highlights the
need for credibility assessments at a more granu-
lar level, because the domain-level is sometimes
too generic. We can have credibility on the source
itself, but having different values for parts of it.
In addition to the above, some domains are web-
sites that are just mediators to reaching the orig-
inal content. In this category we can see URL
shorteners (e.g., bit.ly) and web archives (e.g.,
archive.org). The annotated claim appear-
ances should point directly to the origin of the con-
tent, and this set of examples underlines the need
to add relationships with different semantics (e.g.,
sameAs) to indicate redirects.
5 Open challenges
From the results of our analysis, we see a set of
open challenges that we aim to point out.
First of all, how to handle disagreement? Why
should one rely on one origin of information in-
stead of another? To answer these questions, it is
not enough to look at the confidence expressed by
the origin itself, because this only expresses their
beliefs. We might need to adapt the Dempster-
Shafer theory (Beynon et al., 2000) in order to
include also an external weight that measures the
trust that a certain origin deserves. To obtain this
trust factor we need to compute the credibility that
the origin under analysis has. Between the score
of credibility (in the range [−1;+1]) and the trust
factor (that is a weight in the range [0; 1]) we need
to define a relationship function that is able to have
higher trust of the origins that have a higher credi-
bility, but still takes into consideration origins that
have a neutral (or also negative) credibility. This
process can be applied recursively until we reach a
set of a-priori origins that we (or the users, allow-
ing customisation) believe in. Overall, the deci-
sion on disagreement cases needs to be taken with
a multi-weighted voting mechanism, accounting
for i) confidence of the assessment itself ii) trust
in the origin and iii) granularity level.
A second challenge is how to present this kind
of results to the public. In order to avoid critics
(as happened to NG25 or to the Poynter list of Un-
reliable News Sources26), the direction that needs
25https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/01/
newsguard-changed-its-mind-about-the-
daily-mails-quality-its-green-now-not-
red/
26https://www.poynter.org/letter-from-
the-editor/2019/letter-from-the-editor/
to be taken is to provide a risk of misinformation
measure instead of saying that a certain source is
not good or credible. And we need to provide
support for the score provided, by linking it to
the original assessments, delegating to them their
own statements. Then the explanation needs to
be complete also in the case of multi-step assess-
ments, when also the origins of the assessments
have been evaluated. In this case we need to pro-
vide the score and the evidence also for the origins
involved.
6 Conclusions
This paper presented a comparison of different ori-
gins of credibility assessments.
The comparison has been done using measure-
ments of overlap, in order to see whether differ-
ent origins evaluate the same domains, showing a
quite low average overlap. This underlines the im-
portance of combining different origins, in order
to achieve better coverage over more domains.
Our measurements of agreement have shown
groups of origins that agree more and some that
agree less. This sets the importance of effectively
combining the different assessments with credibil-
ity measures of the origins themselves.
Furthermore, this paper compared the data com-
ing from source and document level, looking at
discrepancies between the two levels. This under-
lined the importance of being able to be more spe-
cific than only labelling the domain with a specific
value of credibility.
We acknowledge the many limitations of this
study, particularly due to the limited availability
of fact-checking data and to the oversimplification
of just considering the source level. In particu-
lar, having just one unified measure of credibil-
ity, without doing a multidimensional comparison
(e.g., factuality, bias, intention), seems to be limit-
ing and the citizens should be informed about each
component of the score provided.
In future work we aim to investigate the chal-
lenges identified in Section 5, in order to account
for disagreeing origins and to have a way to inte-
grate the different measures of credibility for the
sources involved. Additionally, we plan to extend
the nodes definition not only to news sources but
also allowing document and claim level nodes, in
the direction of creating a Credibility Knowledge
Graph that can be explored and used to improve
the inference at different levels.
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